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INTRODUCTION 
Local government law scholarship has a “law and ___” problem.  It 
should be relatively uncontroversial to note that, over the last forty 
years, most fields of legal scholarship have been profoundly 
transformed by the incorporation of the tools and analytical methods 
used in economics, political science, and other social scientific 
disciplines.  Local government law has not been immune.  It is not 
hard to find in local government law scholarship discussions of 
concepts drawn from economics and political science, as well as from 
a host of other disciplines.  What is notable, and what I will show in 
this Essay, is that these references are, for the most part, extremely 
dated. 
Specifically, I will argue that local government law has not kept up 
with the intellectual movements that have defined the last twenty or 
so years in the study of cities or politics.  I will focus on the two areas 
of social science that have been among the most important influences 
on legal scholarship generally: economics and positive political 
science.  But as I will discuss in the conclusion, the same point could 
be made with respect to other social scientific disciplines.  Our field 
 
* Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. 
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has had many successes, but it is being held back by a failure to keep 
up with contemporary social science. 
The Essay is divided into three parts.  Part I addresses local 
government law’s interaction with economics.  In local government 
law scholarship that deals with economic issues, there is frequent 
discussion of the work of Charles Tiebout, who showed in the 1950s 
that under certain assumptions, if local governments provide purely 
local public services and individuals are mobile and able to choose 
among local governments in an area, local public services will be 
provided at an efficient level.1  But, although there have been many 
advances in the use of the Tiebout model through the years, and 
useful criticisms of it,2 it is far from the only economic model relevant 
to cities or local government law.  But until very recently at least, 
scholars failed to notice a revolution in urban economics, specifically 
research on agglomeration economics.3 
Agglomeration economics focuses on why cities exist in the first 
place, given the higher rents for property in urban areas.4  Scholars 
working in this field argue that urban residents pay higher rents, but 
receive gains from reduced shipping costs, increased market size, and 
information spillovers.5  Changes in the form of these gains can 
explain major changes in urban form, or the gains from public 
policies.  Agglomeration economics has become the dominant tool for 
understanding the effect of changes in land use and other local 
policies.6  But while other fields incorporated the newest things in 
 
 1. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. 
POL. ECON. 416 (1956); see also Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in 
Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 503 (1997) (“The dominant law and 
economics model of local government, based on the work of Charles M. Tiebout, 
assumes that decentralization of power to local governments promotes the efficient 
delivery of public goods and services.”); David Schleicher, The City as a Law and 
Economic Subject, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1508 (2010) (“The study of the 
relationship between local government law and economics has long had one central 
text: Charles Tiebout’s famous 1956 article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.”). 
 2. See infra notes 14–20 and accompanying text.   
 3. See infra notes 32–64 and accompanying text for a discussion of research in 
agglomeration economics and the limited degree it has been incorporated into legal 
scholarship. 
 4. For a literature review of contemporary work in agglomeration economics, 
see Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1515–29. 
 5. See Edward L. Glaeser & David C. Mare, Cities and Skills, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 
316, 316–19 (2001); Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1522–23. 
 6. See EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL 
EQUILIBRIUM 1–12 (2010) (discussing agglomeration economics and spatial 
equilibrium as key insights of economics for studying cities). 
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economic research—from antitrust’s embrace of industrial 
organization theory to behavioral economics’ influence throughout 
the legal academy7—advances in urban economics have largely been 
absent from local government scholarship. 
Part II discusses local government law’s interaction with political 
science and finds similar problems to the ones discussed in Part I.  
One can find discussion in local government law scholarship of work 
in political science on growth machines, “city limits,” regime theory, 
and pluralism, some of the dominant methodologies in urban politics 
studies since the middle of the last century.8  But there is almost no 
discussion of positive political theory, rational choice models of 
legislative behavior, models of political party organization and 
competition, empirical research on voting and legislative behavior, or 
any of the other moves that have characterized the last few decades of 
political science.9  Here the problem is not only in legal scholarship, 
but also in the urban politics sub-discipline of political science, which 
one scholar has called a “black hole” for its own refusal to use 
contemporary methodologies.10  
But problems in urban politics research should not stand in the way 
of local government law scholars using the tools of modern political 
 
 7. See Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the 
Chicago School’s Influence on Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 1, 1–5 (2009) 
(discussing influence of Chicago and Post-Chicago Schools of industrial organization 
economics on antitrust law and scholarship); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. 
Ginsberg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws and Implications 
for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1036–66 (2012) (discussing the rise of 
behavioral economics and the related rise of behavioral law and economics). 
 8. The classic citations for each of these theories are ROBERT DAHL, WHO 
GOVERNS? 329–43 (1961) (explaining New Haven politics as a relatively open forum 
in which competing interests on different issues collectively make policy); JOHN R. 
LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PLACE 262 (1987) (developing the theory of “growth machine” cities); PAUL 
PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 31–65, 150–66 (1981) (arguing that the threat of residents 
leaving in the face of efforts to redistribute wealth limits the policy options and 
shapes the politics inside cities); CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: 
GOVERNING ATLANTA 1946–88 (1989) (explaining Atlanta politics as the product of a 
“regime” of downtown business elites that incorporated black leaders into their 
public and private sector governing apparatus). 
 9. See infra note 67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dominance of 
formal modeling and empirical work in modern political science (and reaction to it 
among some political scientists). 
 10. See Joshua Sapochine et al., Is Urban Politics a Black Hole? Analyzing the 
Boundary Between Political Science and Urban Politics, 43 URB. AFF. REV. 76 (2007) 
(arguing that methodologies commonly used throughout the rest of political science 
have not been employed in urban politics research and that the methods and findings 
of urban politics scholars have not had much influence with other political scientists).   
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science.  While local government law scholars have focused 
substantially on questions of the power of exit by residents and the 
benefits of different forms of institutional design—both of voting 
systems and governmental form—Part II will argue that there has 
been too little focus on studying the incentives of local officials or 
strategic interaction between such officials inside existing 
governmental structures.  Similarly, when discussing whether power 
should be allocated to local or state legislatures, or how regional 
governments should be structured (if at all), local government law 
scholars have largely ignored research on how local officials get 
elected and how local party systems work.  Also, very little empirical 
work has been done on how local political systems or legislatures 
operate.  Again, this is in contrast to other fields of legal scholarship, 
like statutory interpretation, administrative law, and constitutional 
law, which have all substantially incorporated and influenced work in 
contemporary political science.11 
Part III will expand the scope of the discussion to other social 
sciences.  Research into cities is booming in a whole variety of fields, 
particularly in economics, but also in fields ranging from criminology 
to the “science of cities.”12  But with a few exceptions, local 
government law scholars have not used these findings or 
methodological approaches.  Our failure to incorporate the best work 
by other types of scholars has been harmful to the field.  Ignoring 
contemporary trends in the social sciences has left the field on the 
 
 11. Particularly in the areas of statutory interpretation and administrative law, it 
is hard to understate the influence these approaches have had on legal scholarship.  
For discussions and examples of the influence of positive political theory on statutory 
interpretation, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political 
Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 461 (1992); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: 
The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive 
Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1431-32 (2003).  For discussions 
and examples of the use of positive political theory in administrative law, see 
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 180 (1999); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of 
Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994); Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal 
Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008); Barry R. Weingast 
& Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory 
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).  In 
constitutional law, see Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle 
of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 662 (2011); Jide O. Nzelibe & 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, 
Rational Voting and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617 (2010). 
 12. See infra notes 66–88 and accompanying text. 
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margin of mainstream legal academic thought, even though many 
important contemporary legal debates have a substantial local 
government law component.13 
But more importantly, our failure to integrate modern work in the 
social sciences into local government law has been bad for public and 
scholarly debate about cities and local governance.  As local 
government law scholars, we have a great deal to add to these 
debates, as work by social scientists frequently fails to acknowledge 
or deal adequately with the institutions and legal processes through 
which public policy in cities is made.  But we will only be able to add 
to these debates if we understand them.  The first step to making our 
field more analytically interesting and practically useful is admitting 
we have a problem.  A “law and ___” problem. 
I.  LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW AND URBAN ECONOMICS 
At a conference full of local government law scholars, one need not 
spend too much time explaining the Tiebout Model.  Tiebout argued 
that, under certain assumptions, local policy outputs will be provided 
at the efficient level: that is, the amount and kind of local public 
services and taxes would match residents’ preferences.14  Individuals 
will choose where to live among many local governments in a region 
based on their local policies, and this sorting process will result in a 
 
 13. For instance, there is extensive literature discussing the huge prison 
population in the United States.  Despite the fact that crime is investigated and 
deterred by local officials (police officers) and largely prosecuted by local officials 
(district attorneys), most discussions of mass incarcerations have until very recently 
ignored any discussion of the types of questions that animate local government law, 
like whether local officials have the right incentives, whether there are externalities 
to local governmental behavior or the effects of putting the onus of taxation on local 
communities. See, e.g., W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (On the State’s Dime): How 
Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why 
It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987, 992–93 (2012) (finding that the fact that states 
pay for prison while county district attorneys prosecute crimes leads to excessive 
punishment in California, and noting that the literature has ignored counties’ 
contribution to over incarceration); John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply 
Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1106–07 (2013) 
(reviewing ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2011)) (discussing how a leading study of 
incarceration does not even address in passing the role played by local officials in 
generating mass incarceration); see also infra notes 91–101 for a discussion of how 
criminal law scholars have begun to focus on problems in local government law as an 
explanation for changes in crime rates without local government law scholars 
discussing the issue frequently.    
 14. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 416–20 (1956). 
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good fit between policies and voter preferences.15  Bruce Hamilton 
and Wallace Oates fleshed out Tiebout’s model, explaining and 
providing empirical support for the claim that the quality of public 
policies will be capitalized into property values, and showing how the 
model has no equilibrium if property taxes are used but there is no 
zoning (and thus providing a justification local zoning power).16  Bill 
Fischel provided the model with a “supply side,” arguing that local 
homeowners are intensely worried about variation in the value of 
their home, and thus have an incentive to get involved in politics, to 
ensure that local governmental officials do not cause prices to fall by 
driving people out. 17  Fischel thus made “voice” speak in the same 
language as exit, and provided a story why certain powers—property 
taxation, zoning and schools—were traditionally allocated to local 
governments.18 
The Tiebout Model has been heavily incorporated into local 
government law, with scholars like Vicki Been, Lee Fennell, Chris 
Serkin and many others using Tieboutian arguments to understand 
the costs and benefits of land use policies, takings by cities, and other 
local governmental policies.19  The Tiebout Model has also been 
heavily criticized by a variety of scholars, including Gerry Frug, who 
object to its assumption that local government services can or should 
be understood as a consumption good, and a host of others for failing 
to consider limits on mobility, inter-local externalities or 
distributional effects.20  In his opus Our Localism, Richard Briffault 
 
 15. See id. 
 16. See William A. Fischel, Introduction to THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: 
ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 1, 4–18 (William A. 
Fischel ed., 2006) (describing the development of the Tiebout model); Bruce W. 
Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. 
STUD. 205 (1975); Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public 
Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and The 
Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957 (1969). 
 17. Fischel, supra note 16, at 14–18. 
 18. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES 
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE 
POLICIES 8 (2001); Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE 
TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE 
OATES 21, 32 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006). 
 19. See Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking 
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 521 (1991); Lee 
Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000); Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale 
of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883 (2007). 
 20. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT 
BUILDING WALLS 167–73 (1999) (critiquing Tiebout for treating city services as being 
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argued that Frug’s approach to cities, rooted in participatory political 
theory, and the Tiebout’s economic model provide two contrasting 
“tales of the city.”21  It is relatively clear that when legal scholars talk 
about the economic approach to local governments, they mean only 
one thing: the Tiebout Model. 
But the Tiebout Model is not, and has never been, the only 
economic model about cities and local governments.  Two stand out: 
“mono-centric” models of cities and agglomeration economics.  When 
the field of local government law was consolidating in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, urban economics was in a period of relative stasis, 
focused on mono-centric models of cities that probably looked only 
weakly descriptive to the scholars of the time if they were cognizant 
of them.  However, starting in the early 1990s, agglomeration models 
took off, powered by mathematical innovation and the existence of 
sufficient computing power to make them work.22  Associated with 
leading scholars like Edward Glaeser, Paul Krugman, Robert Lucas, 
and Paul Romer, this work exploded and turned out to be crucial to 
many modern models of international trade and economic growth.23  
Furthermore, it is extremely relevant to almost everything we as local 
government law scholars talk about.  Until roughly 2007, however, 
there was little mention of it in the legal literature.  Even though 
there have now been several articles exploring the importance of 
agglomeration to local government law, the dominant mode of urban 
economics for the last twenty or so years has only made a small dent 
in the field. 
 
like a consumption good for residents); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, 
and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New 
Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1991–2015 (2000) (criticizing Tiebout for failing to 
consider distribution); Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 1824, 1834 (2003) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER 
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, 
SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES (2001)) (criticizing the Tiebout model for 
failing to consider externalities). 
 21. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 426–27 (1990). 
 22. See MASAHISA FUJITA ET AL., THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1–10 (1999). 
 23. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1515–28 (summarizing the work in the field); 
see also Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 140 (1998); 
Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1127 (1992); 
Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 3, 39 (1988); Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. 
POL. ECON. 1002, 1006 (1986). 
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 In the 1970s, most urban economic work used models based on 
the pioneering work of nineteenth century German economist Johann 
Heinrich von Thünen.24  Von Thünen’s big insight was that, even 
without planning, cities would take an organized form due to 
competition among land users.25  Von Thünen showed that, if each 
landowner decided what crops to plant based on the yield-per-acre of 
different crops and the cost of transporting those crops to a center-
city market, concentric rings of different crops would emerge around 
the market.26  Land close to the market will be more expensive 
because it is cheaper to send goods to market from that land, and 
hence it will be used for high-yield and expensive-to-ship crops.27  
Land uses should be less intense or productive as one gets further 
from a city center, and unplanned competition will lead to a 
minimization of the combined costs of transportation and 
production.28  In the 1960s, scholars like William Alonso, Edward 
Mills, and Richard Muth adapted this model to modern city forms, 
suggesting that transportation costs drove where in cities people 
located—skyscrapers in city centers, surrounded by apartments, 
followed by dense suburbia, followed by exurbs and so on.29  These 
“monocentric” models were the workhorses of urban economics of 
the time. 
However, although they yielded some powerful insights about the 
relationship between methods of transportation and urban form, 
these models must have seemed rather creaky in the 1970s and 80s, 
when many of the classic pieces in local government law were 
written.30  As cities adapted themselves to the fact that the car, which 
can travel in any direction, replaced walking or trains as the dominant 
 
 24. See J.H. VON THÜNEN, THE ISOLATED STATE 110–13 (Peter Hall ed., Carla M. 
Wartenberg trans., Pergamon Press 1966) (1826); see also FUJITA ET AL., supra note 
22, at 15-17 (discussing the Von Thünen model). 
 25. THÜNEN, supra note 24, at 110–13. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. FUJITA ET AL., supra note 22, at 15–17 (describing Von Thünen’s findings). 
 29. See generally WILLIAM ALONSO, LOCATION AND LAND USE (1964); RICHARD 
MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING (1969); Edwin S. Mills, An Aggregative Model of 
Resource Allocation in a Metropolitan Area, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 197 (1967). 
 30. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic 
and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 385, 429, 475–89 (1977); Gerald E. Frug, The City 
as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980); Frank I. Michelman, Political 
Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local 
Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977–1978); see also Ellickson, supra, at 
425 (discussing what was known about the positive externalities of density but 
acknowledges that knowledge at the time was “fragmentary”). 
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method of transportation, the assumption of a single-central market 
to which all goods were sent became increasingly problematic.  
“Monocentric” models had difficulty explaining the changing fortunes 
of center cities during the period, and they could not easily deal with 
rapidly developing edge cities, tall office parks, and residential 
centers far from traditional downtowns.31 
In the late 1980s and 90s, however, work on agglomeration 
economics took off.  Building upon Alfred Marshall’s turn of the last 
century insights,32 it started with a more fundamental question: why 
do cities exist in the first place?33  The existence of cities cannot 
simply be assumed, particularly because locating a business (or 
buying an apartment) is more expensive in cities than in rural areas.34  
For an economic model to explain why people and business would 
move to cities, it needs to explain the gains resulting from locating in 
urban areas that justify the higher costs.  Marshall argued that there 
were three sources of gains from urban agglomeration: reducing 
shipping costs, the benefits of large markets, and information 
spillovers.35  That is, people and businesses moved to make it easier to 
participate in common markets.36  As Lucas later noted, “What can 
people be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents for, if not 
for being near other people?”37  Up until the late 1980s, Marshall’s 
insights had been extremely difficult for economists to model, largely 
because any story about why cities develop necessarily involves 
increasing returns to scale and non-linearity.38  As economics became 
 
 31. See GLAESER, supra note 6, at 44–50. 
 32. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 267–77 (8th ed. 1920). 
 33. See GLAESER, supra note 6, at 1 (“The foremost question of urban economics 
is why cities exist.”); see also Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1516–28. 
 34. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 3, 38 (1988) (“If we postulate only the usual list of economic 
forces, cities should fly apart.  The theory of production contains nothing to hold a 
city together.  A city is simply a collection of factors of production—capital, people 
and land—and land is always far cheaper outside cities than inside.  Why don’t capital 
and people move outside, combining themselves with cheaper land and thereby 
increasing profits.”). 
 35. See MARSHALL, supra note 32, at 267–77; see also Schleicher, supra note 1, at 
1516-28. 
 36. GLAESER, supra note 6, at 6 (“[A] way to understand agglomeration 
economies is to go back to a fundamental definition of cities: the absence of physical 
space between people and firms.  Cities are density, proximity, closeness.”). 
 37. Lucas, supra note 34, at 39 (emphasis omitted). 
 38. FUJITA ET AL., supra note 22, at 3–9; see PAUL KRUGMAN, DEVELOPMENT, 
GEOGRAPHY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 1–3 (1995). 
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more rigorously mathematical, agglomeration economies were largely 
ignored. 
But in the late 1980s, new mathematical tools, such as Dixit-Stiglitz 
constant elasticity of substitution utility functions, and cheaper 
computing power made it easier to model agglomeration gains.39  Paul 
Krugman, Anthony Venables, Masahisa Fujita and others focused on 
how shipping costs can drive regional development, showing that 
where shipping costs were real but not extremely high, producers of 
intermediate goods (such as auto parts) would cluster near final goods 
producers (such as auto manufacturers) to reduce shipping costs.40  
Regions with easily obtainable input parts would then get more final 
goods manufacturers.  They found that city development is likely 
heavily path-dependent.41  A history of development that led to many 
input goods producers being in one region could lead to final good 
producers staying in that region (to be close to those firms) even if 
today’s transportation costs would not lead to the same grouping of 
firms if location decisions were made entirely anew.42  But if transport 
costs continued to fall, city economies could destabilize in ways that 
cities would not recover from even if the fundamentals improved.  
This helps explain much of the history of twentieth-century urban 
areas, with manufacturing clustering in cities linked to the 
transportation network (ports or railroad hubs).43  As shipping costs 
fell with innovations like the combustion engine and shipping 
container, the economies of cities that relied heavily on 
manufacturing, like Detroit and Cleveland, held on for a while and 
then quickly fell apart.44  However, as it became cheaper to move 
goods around the country, shipping costs became relatively less 
important as an explanation of urban success and failure in recent 
years.45 
The other stories have become important for understanding why 
cities succeed.  The existence of large labor markets provides 
residents with opportunities to specialize, easier matching with 
employers needing their skills, and insurance against the failure of 
 
 39. FUJITA ET AL., supra note 22, at 3. 
 40. Id. at 9–10, 61–77; Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1517–20.   
 41. Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1520. 
 42. Id. at 1518–20. 
 43. Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto, Did the Death of Distance 
Hurt Detroit and Help New York?, in AGGLOMERATION ECONOMICS 303–05 
(Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2010). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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their employers.  An actor in Los Angeles can focus on being an 
expert in playing a narrow type of role because there are enough 
productions that feature that specialty, he can match with many 
different movie studios and theaters until one works well, and he will 
likely be able to find employment without having to move if his 
employer goes bankrupt.46  On the other hand, an actor in Salt Lake 
City will not see the same gains from specialization, matching, and 
insurance against the failure of a single firm.  The same dynamics 
explain why certain retailers cluster, from bars to diamond sellers.47  It 
even helps explain why unmarried people find cities particularly 
attractive, as being in a deep dating market has the same 
specialization, matching and insurance benefits.48 
The final Marshallian category is perhaps the most important 
today: information spillovers.  People learn from informal discussions 
with their neighbors, whether they are in the same industry or across 
industries.  People participating in these informal discussions become 
more productive.  Glaeser and David Maré, among others, have 
shown that urban location improves wage growth: people who move 
to cities develop skills and then see their wages grow.49  The result is 
an “urban wage premium”—people in cities make much more money 
due to their developing skills, and as a result, can pay the higher 
rents.50  Modern theories of endogenous economic growth often turn 
on human capital spillovers in cities.51  Information spillovers are 
particularly important in today’s knowledge-based economy.  
Technology companies pay top rents to be near other technology 
companies, be they in Silicon Valley in the Bay Area or Silicon Alley 
in New York. 
 
 46. Dan Rodriguez and I have used this example before. See Daniel B. Rodriguez 
& David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 642–43 
(2012). 
 47. Id. at 643. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Edward L. Glaeser & David C. Maré, Cities and Skills, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 
316, 316–19 (2001); Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1522.  An excellent recent paper used 
random lotteries for H1-B visas to test the effect of geography on wages and suggests 
that there are large level effects from location. See Michael A. Clemens, The Effect 
of International Migration on Productivity: Evidence from Randomized Allocation 
of U.S. Visas to Software Workers at an Indian Firm 1, 10 (Ctr. for Global Dev., 
Working Paper, Dec. 3, 2012), available at www.aeaweb.org/aea/2013conference/ 
program/retrieve.php?pdfid=459.  Clemens found that workers in the same Indian 
firm that were sent to the U.S. instantly became more productive.  
 50. Glaeser & Maré, supra note 49, at 316. 
 51. That is, those that do not assume a level of technological growth, like the 
famed Solow model.  See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1523–25. 
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Agglomeration economics has become the dominant economic 
approach to thinking about cities, and has been for quite a long time.  
Until roughly five years ago, it was barely mentioned in local 
government law scholarship.  In recent years, however, there have 
been a few papers that began exploring the importance of this work 
for local governments and its interaction with the Tiebout Model.  
For instance, Clay Gillette argued that, contrary to assumptions of 
scholars using the Tiebout Model, local governments do engage in 
substantial economic redistribution and that agglomeration 
economies are likely the reason they are able to do so without 
promoting exit by taxed residents.52  More generally, in my paper The 
City as a Law and Economic Subject, I showed that Tiebout sorting 
and agglomeration should have an inverse relationship.53  Strong 
agglomeration economies can reduce the efficiency of sorting as they 
make location decisions stickier, and extensive sorting reduces the 
efficiency of agglomeration by changing the economically important 
decision of where people would locate absent laws that condition the 
receipt of a jurisdiction’s services on living in it.54  Work by Robert 
Inman, Andrew Haughwout, and Rich Schragger have fleshed out 
some other implications for local government law, from urban 
development to contracts between cities and suburbs.55  Many of these 
scholars—including Peter Byrne, Steve Eagle, Rick Hills, Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Dan Rodriguez, Peter Seligman, and myself, have 
focused on the myriad implications of this literature for land use law.56  
 
 52. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL 
DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURTS 74–105 (2011). 
 53. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1525–35. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally ANDREW F. HAUGHWOUT & ROBERT P. INMAN, HOW SHOULD 
SUBURBS HELP THEIR CENTRAL CITIES? (2004) (discussing economic 
interdependence of cities and suburbs as an argument for intercity contracts); David 
Schleicher, I Would, but I Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit nor Voice Substantially 
Limits Big City Corruption, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 277, 281–84 (2011) (arguing strong 
agglomeration gains in cities reduce the threat of exit and thus can help explain big 
city political corruption); Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice 
of Local Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311 (2010) (arguing that local 
economic development policies are largely futile). 
 56. See Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition: Private and Public 
Benefit in an Era of Agglomeration, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1070–74 (2011) 
(using agglomeration economics to discuss issues in government takings); Roderick 
M. Hills & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning To 
Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 262–67 (2010) 
(discussing the effect of noncumulative zoning on agglomeration economies); Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property and Positive Externalities, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2012); Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 46, at 637. 
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As land use regulates where people locate inside cities, it clearly 
affects how agglomeration economies develop. 
However, this is still just the tip of the iceberg.  Agglomeration 
economics is not part of most of the major casebooks in the field,57 
nor is it featured in much of the literature.  There are dozens of local 
government law articles each year that invoke the Tiebout Model.58  
But, more than twenty years after agglomeration economics’ 
renaissance, there have been no more than a handful of papers 
discussing agglomeration economics.59 
It is particularly disappointing that agglomeration economics 
provides local government law scholars with a third “tale of the 
city.”60  Although extremely different, Frug’s approach to 
understanding cities and the Tiebout Model—the two “views of the 
city” discussed by Briffault—start from a common methodological 
assumption that the creation of the local government or polity should 
be where analysis begins.61  That is, both take as the unit of analysis 
the local government (or system of local governments) and seek to 
determine its/their success in providing goods or serving as a place to 
engage in collective determination.62  Agglomeration economics starts 
in a very different position.  Cities arise on their own for reasons 
unrelated to local governmental policies: people create market places, 
build houses near one another, etc., and do so regardless of local 
governmental form.  Local governments can affect these location 
decisions, either through regulations or by providing (or failing to 
provide) attractive services or benefits.  But people will move and 
build cities regardless, as there is a market for physical location.  
Local governments play a role much like administrative agencies do 
in other markets: they are regulators of the location market. 
This third “tale of the city” does not displace Frug or Tiebout’s 
views of the city; it supplements them.  Employing, engaging with, 
and critiquing agglomeration economics would have legal scholars ask 
an additional set of normative questions about how local government 
 
 57. One exception is LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 876 (3d ed. 2004), which includes a 
discussion of Haughwout and Inman’s work.   
 58. A rough and ready Lexis search that included the names of leading scholars in 
the field—Frug and Tiebout—came up with seventy-eight since 2007. 
 59. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 60. This argument was made in Schleicher, supra note 1, at 1545-55. 
 61. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 391 (1990). 
 62. Id. at 391–92. 
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law should be judged, such as, “What market failures are there in the 
location market?”  “Are local regulations correcting these market 
failures?”  The harm that ignoring agglomeration economics has done 
to local government law scholarship is substantial.  We have not 
focused enough on how local laws and systems of local government 
impact the distribution of residents across the country, the efficiency 
losses created by limiting entry through land use or simply by 
encouraging Tiebout sorting, or how changes in the sources of 
agglomeration gains over time have changed which types of cities 
succeed and which policies work. 
The failure of local government law scholars to incorporate 
modern economic theory has also made policy discussions featuring 
agglomeration economics arguments worse.  For instance, there have 
been many recent debates about the benefits of changing land use 
laws, following Glaeser’s brilliant work revealing the cost of zoning 
restriction in many metropolitan areas, and insightful books by 
journalists like Matt Yglesias and Ryan Avent.63  But economic work 
on the subject has not fully engaged with the legal processes through 
which land use policy is made.64  Enrico Morretti recently released an 
excellent and much discussed book using agglomeration economics to 
examine the changing labor market in the U.S., but it features little 
discussion of how labor law and local regulation affect the 
development of regional economies.65  Legal scholars have much to 
add to these debates, but can only do so if they engage with it.  We 
simply cannot go on imagining that the last word in the economic 
study of local governments and cities is the Tiebout Model. 
 
 63. For just a taste of Glaeser’s work on zoning, see generally Edward L. Glaeser 
& Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulation: Evidence 
from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265 (2008); Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph 
Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restriction on Housing Affordability, 9 FED. RES. 
BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 21 (2003); Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko and 
Raven Saks, Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up? 4–9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 11129, 2005); Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & 
Raven Saks, Why Is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing 
Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331 (2005); Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, Zoning’s 
Steep Price, REGULATION, Fall 2002, at 24.  For additional background, see generally 
RYAN AVENT, THE GATED CITY (e-book, Amazon Digital Servs. 2011); MATTHEW 
YGLESIAS, THE RENT IS TOO DAMN HIGH (e-book, Simon & Schuster 2012). 
 64. For an effort to do so, see David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 
1670 (2013). 
 65. See generally ENRICO MORRETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012).  In 
an interesting recent article, Naomi Schoenbaum explored some of the labor law 
implications of agglomeration economics. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility 
Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1169, 1231–35 (2012). 
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II.  LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW AND POSITIVE POLITICAL 
SCIENCE 
Just as one can find discussions of traditional economic models in 
local government law scholarship, one can find discussions of 
traditional positive political science as well.  (I am discussing positive 
approaches, and notably not democratic theory, a subject that has 
been much mined in the local government law literature.)  The 
leading approaches to studying city politics from twenty or thirty 
years ago—Robert Dahl’s work on pluralism, Paul Peterson’s 
Tiebout-style approach, Harvey Molotch’s scholarship claiming that 
cities are “growth machines,” and Clarence Stone’s work on “regime 
theory”—are probably familiar to most local government law 
scholars.66 
But there is not much local government law work, theoretical or 
empirical, discussing interest group formation, voting behavior, or 
positive political theory analyzing legislative or bureaucratic behavior 
inside local governments.  Such moves are so dominant in political 
science that they spurred the well-known “Perestroika” movement to 
push back against the heavy use of rational choice models, statistical 
methods, and game theory.67  But local government law has been—
again with some exceptions—largely immune to this way of thinking. 
One would think using tools that try to predict and explain how 
differing political arrangements will change the behavior of office 
holders would be natural in a field that focuses on the comparative 
capacity of different political institutions to solve policy problems.68  
Indeed, it is not as if these scholarly ideas have not made their way 
into law schools.  The use of positive political theory, game theory, 
and structural models of legislatures that assume they consist of 
rationally-maximizing politicians has remade the fields of statutory 
interpretation and administrative law and has even made serious 
inroads into constitutional law theory.69 
 
 66. See STONE, supra note 8. 
 67. See Catarina Kinnvall, Not Here, Not Now!: The Absence of a European 
Perestroika Movement, in PERESTROIKA!: THE RAUCOUS REBELLION IN POLITICAL 
SCIENCE 21 (Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 2005) (describing the movement). 
 68. See BAKER & GILLETTE, supra note 57, at 1 (“The study of local government 
law, therefore, necessarily requires that we consider which level of government 
should exercise a particular power and which limits we want to place on any given 
level of government.  A course in local government law, in short, is in large part a 
course in institutional competence and institutional design.”). 
 69. See sources cited supra note 11. 
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Some blame for this can be pointed at the field’s closest sister 
discipline, the urban politics sub-field in political science.  Unlike the 
rest of the field, urban politics has remained somewhat immune to 
rational choice scholarship and empirical methods.  In a well-known 
piece, Joshua Sapotichne, Bryan Jones and Michelle Wolfe asked, Is 
Urban Politics a Black Hole?  Their answer was yes.70  They argued 
that political science scholarship about urban politics was neither 
influenced much by, nor had much influence in, mainstream political 
science.71 Urban politics is dominated by Stone’s regime theory 
approach, a largely descriptive theory that suggests cities are 
governed by “regimes” of businesses and local government officials 
who work together to assemble the power to govern.72  As it is neither 
predictive nor easily generalizable, regime theory is not much used 
outside the subfield of urban politics.73  Questions of interest in much 
of the rest of contemporary political science, ranging from the 
importance of agenda setting and game theoretic interactions 
between legislatures to empirical studies of voting behavior and 
influence and the like, have not much influenced urban politics 
scholarship. 
Blame can also be pointed at scholars using public choice or 
rational choice models in political science and economics more 
generally for not paying much attention to local (and state) politics.  
Rick Hills wrote that public choice scholarship on federalism and 
localism “is voluminous in size but narrow in focus.”74  Public choice 
scholarship focuses almost entirely on mobility between jurisdictions, 
but little of it looks at “how political activity by voters or politicians in 
federal regimes differs from unitary states’ politics.  The literature, in 
other words, focuses on exit, not voice.”75  There is, of course, 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Sapochine et al., supra note 10, at 76. 
 72. Id. at 81.  “Regime analysis views power as fragmented and regimes as the 
collaborative arrangements through which local governments and private actors 
assemble the capacity to govern.  The primary reason for the fragmentation of power 
is the division of labor between market and state.” Karen Mossberger & Gerry 
Stoker, The Evolution of Urban Regime Theory: The Challenge of 
Conceptualization, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 810, 812 (2001). 
 73. Regime theory, as Karen Mossberger and Gerry Stoker note, is “more a 
concept or a model rather than a theory because it has limited ability to explain or 
predict variation in regime formation, maintenance, or change.” Mossberger & 
Stoker, supra note 72, at 811. 
 74. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 207, 207 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne 
Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). 
 75. Id. 
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excellent rational choice and empirical work on how local and state 
politics differ from national politics, aside from the potential for exit.  
Some pieces that immediately come to mind include Elinor Ostrom’s 
Nobel Prize-winning scholarship on how local commons are 
governed, Susan Rose-Ackerman’s work on why laboratories of 
democracy are less innovative than one would think, Bill Fischel’s 
Homevoter Hypothesis, and Eric Oliver’s work on how jurisdiction’s 
size and demography affect political and civic behavior.76  But as Hills 
notes, this is not the major focus of the literature.77  Studies of voting 
behavior are not much better: most political scientists studying voter 
choice focus on national or at least state politics, although there have 
been a few neat recent papers looking at voter behavior in local 
elections.78 
The absence of modern methods in the urban politics subfield 
should be an opportunity for local government law scholars.  There is 
much territory to cover, in discussing both the use and limits of these 
tools.  Some truly exceptional scholarship has seized on this 
opportunity.  Early in the field’s development, Frank Michelman 
famously compared public choice and public interest explanations for 
a variety of cases.79  More recently, Lynn Baker, Clay Gillette, Rick 
Hills, and Dan Rodriguez have used public choice and positive 
political theory more generally to discuss issues as disparate as how 
local initiatives and referenda work,80 the operation of Dillon’s Rule,81 
 
 76. See FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 6–14; ERIC OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA 
29–32 (2001); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking 
and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 
(1980). 
 77. Hills, supra note 74, at 207. 
 78. Recently, there have been a few excellent studies of the determinants of local 
voting in Mayoral and other races in recent years. See, e.g., KAREN KAUFMANN, THE 
URBAN VOTER: GROUP CONFLICT AND MAYORAL VOTING BEHAVIOR IN AMERICAN 
CITIES (2004); R. Douglas Arnold & Nicholas Carnes, Holding Mayors Accountable: 
New York’s Executives from Koch to Bloomberg, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI.  949 (2012); 
Cheryl Boudreau et al., Lost in Space?: Shortcuts and Spatial Voting in Low-
Information Elections (UC Davis Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 328, March 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232371. 
 79. See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 
IND. L.J. 145, 187 (1977). 
 80. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation and Collective 
Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930 (1988). 
 81. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or Can 
Public Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959 
(1991). 
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the dynamics of state and local and federal interactions,82 inter-local 
contracts,83 and how courts should address local government efforts at 
redistribution.84  I have used these tools to write about how election 
laws inhibit electoral competition at the state and local levels based 
on a model of party behavior,85 and (with Rick Hills) how cycling 
preferences and distributive politics norms in local legislatures in the 
absence of parties can produce excessively restrictive land use 
policies.86  Outside the narrow tribe of local government law scholars, 
Brian Galle and Joseph Leahy have usefully revisited Rose-
Ackerman’s work on local policy innovation,87 and Gerald Gamm and 
Thad Kousser have done fascinating work on how competition in 
state legislatures explain variation in the number of district bills and 
special legislation.88 
As the last paragraph showed, public choice has been used to 
analyze behavior of groups inside cities, game theory to understand 
the interaction between cities, and positive political theory to 
understand the behavior of legislators, political parties, and voters 
inside cities.  These tools do not hold the same place in the field of 
local government law as they do in other fields of public law, from 
statutory interpretation to administrative law, and their potential 
utility should be quite clear. 
 
 82. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 707 (1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? 
The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187 (2005). 
 83. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation, 21 J. L. & 
POL. 365, 367–69 (2005). See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and 
Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190 (2001). 
 84.  See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and 
Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1057 (2007); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism 
and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2001); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State 
Constitutional Failure, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243 (2011). 
 85. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council 
Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 419–22 (2007). 
 86. See Schleicher, supra note 64, at 1672–76; see also Roderick J. Hills, Jr. & 
David Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget”, (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law 
& Econ. Research Paper No. 11-18, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1816368. 
 87. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy 
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1347–60 (2009). 
 88. See Gerald Gamm & Thad Kousser, Parties and Pork: Historical Evidence 
from the American States, 22–26 (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Meeting Paper 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1900816 (finding that polarized parties bias 
statewide spending towards their constituents). See generally Gerald Gamm & Thad 
Kousser, Broad Bills or Particularistic Policy? Historical Patterns in American State 
Legislatures, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 151 (2010). 
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When we propose (or oppose) the creation of certain forms of 
regional governments, suggest power be shifted among actors inside 
cities, or discuss the power of certain groups inside existing local 
governments, we ought to note that there is extensive literature 
discussing when and under what conditions these changes will 
promote certain democratic advantages (and disadvantages) like 
party competition or distributive pork-barrel politics.  Local 
government law is full of such proposals, and they would be far 
stronger and more convincing if they were grounded in clear 
assumptions about political behavior.  In addition, they would be 
more easily understood by political scientists and policy-makers. 
Again, as with its engagement with economics, the problem local 
government law faces is keeping up with the fast changing and often 
extremely technical nature of modern political science.  But it is 
important that we do so.  In order to understand how local politicians 
use or are limited by the formal powers of local governments, we 
need models for understanding their incentives and behavior.  These 
models have proven extremely powerful when they have been used, 
allowing legal scholars to provide explanations regarding what legal 
impediments stand in the way of local governments working together 
on problems at the regional level,89 or how land use procedures serve 
to limit the creation of affordable housing.90  There is great potential 
for other applications of this type of research. 
III.  LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW’S “LAW AND ___” PROBLEM 
MORE GENERALLY: LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, SOCIAL 
SCIENCE AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
The previous two sections discussed how local government law 
scholarship has not kept up with new work in economics and political 
science.  The same is true with respect to other types of social science 
and law. 
Take criminal law and criminology.  A whole series of scholars 
have argued that a myriad of crime and justice problems—excessively 
harsh penalties, reduced police presence in high crime areas, mass 
 
 89. See Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 190, 190–96 (2001) (arguing that impediments to enforcing inter-local 
contracts—and not coordination problems among local governments—stand in the 
way of inter-local approaches to regional problems). 
 90. See Schleicher, supra note 64, at 1674–78 (arguing that the absence of parties 
and strategic interaction between local legislators has led to excessive restrictions on 
housing supply). 
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incarceration, and even limits on our ability to remove dangerous 
teens from high-crime situations—are rooted in what are properly 
understood as local government law problems.  In his final works, the 
late, great Bill Stuntz tried to explain why we rely far more on harsh 
punishments rather than extra policing as a method of crime control, 
even though all evidence points to the greater efficiency of spending 
marginal dollars on police.91  He argued that since police officers are 
being paid out of local government’s own source funding, while the 
costs of imprisonment are born by the state, American cities have few 
police officers and excessively harsh punishments.92 
Further, Stuntz argues that district attorneys have become 
increasingly willing to punish severely because crime has localized, 
with a huge share of crime taking place in a small number of 
neighborhoods.93  For much of the twentieth century, crime spread 
through jurisdictions, such that victims, offenders, and the 
populations that produced them were part of a district attorney’s 
electoral calculus.94  As crime has localized, an increasingly large 
number of county voters have begun to see crime as a distant, 
although terrifying, problem.95  This has led to wild swings between 
lenity and severity in punishment, as policies chase preferences 
formed by casual viewings of the evening news rather than lived 
experience.96  One way to look at Stuntz’s argument is that local 
government law—the way local government revenue is raised as well 
as jurisdiction size and shape—bears substantial blame for the size of 
America’s crime and prison problems. 97 
 
 91. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, 5–6 (2011); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: 
NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 108–17 (2012) 
(discussing the efficacy of an increased numbers of police). See generally William J. 
Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1997-2040 (2008). 
 92. See Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 91, at 2014–16. 
 93. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 91, at 6. 
 94. See id. at 5–8. 
 95. Id. at 4–8. 
 96. Id. at 36. 
 97. The relationship between crime’s location and jurisdictional shape can also 
tell us things about why policing inside local governments may not be optimal either.  
Both Frank Zimring and a Department of Justice report by top academic 
criminologists have found that “hot spot” policing in high crime areas reduced crime 
overall. ANTHONY A. BRAGA ET AL., POLICE PROGRAMS TO PREVENT CRIME IN HOT 
SPOT AREAS, 4–14 (2012), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/ 
041218459_CPRS7_Crime_Hot_Spots.pdf.  However, in large jurisdictions with 
highly localized “hot spots,” it takes only a small extension from Stuntz’s argument to 
note that we may see less of this type of policing than is optimal for reducing the 
SCHLEICHER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:29 PM 
2013] “LAW AND ___” PROBLEM 1971 
Local government law has also been implicated in efforts at 
innovative crime fighting policy.  Mark Kleiman, a leading crime 
policy scholar, has argued that separating political authority has 
limited governments’ ability to pass some promising crime reduction 
strategies.98  For instance, starting the school day later, or just keeping 
the school open so that that teens are not out of school before most 
parents return home, has been found to be a very effective technique 
for reducing teen crime.99  But, at least in cities without mayoral 
control over the schools, the officials held accountable for crime have 
no control over the schools, and school officials care little about the 
crime rate.  Kleiman tells similar stories about other possible crime 
reduction strategies that could be enacted by educational and public 
health professionals.100  These arguments are about how local 
government law creates organization structures inside cities and the 
effect that has on crime fighting.  One would think, based on work by 
Stuntz, Kleiman, and Frank Zimring, who bring issues like this to the 
forefront, that local government law scholars would find in 
criminology and criminal law a fertile base for thinking about local 
government law more generally.  But aside from Nicole Garnett and 
her fantastic work on the interface between land use and criminal law 
in this area, which both uses and critiques criminological theories, this 
is not a major feature of local government law study.101 
Moreover, it is not just criminology and criminal law.  Recently, 
there has been an uptick in the study of the “science of cities.”  
Several schools have been formed to do this and companies have 
 
overall crime rate, because it involves removing police from where the large majority 
of people live to send them to high crime areas. 
 98. MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS 
CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT 121–26 (2009). 
 99. Id. at 123–126. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, 
AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA (2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing 
the Urban Commons, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1995, (2012); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The 
Order-Maintenance Agenda as Land Use Policy, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 131 (2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 43 (2012).  Bob Ellickson has also explored the relationship between land use 
and street misconduct. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in 
City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 
1165 (1996); see also James M. Anderson et al., Reducing Crime by Shaping the Built 
Environment with Zoning: An Empirical Study of Los Angeles, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
699 (2011) (testing several theories about the interaction between zoning and crime 
rates).   
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invested heavily in developing “smart” technologies for cities.102  
Rather than being a specific field of study, this approach uses the very 
large data sets that local governments can produce (and suggests the 
creation of even more, from using sensors to study traffic to infrared 
monitoring of city buildings to study energy use) to make predictions 
and policy recommendations.103  Although “smart city” approaches 
seem to cover much of the gauntlet of urban policy, there do not 
appear to be any such efforts to use them to study the effect of local 
laws and legal innovation.  Legal scholars have not helped.  While 
empirical legal studies have become a major part of the landscape of 
legal scholarship, it has barely touched the field of local government 
law. 
 
 102. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Lab has a project called 
“City Science,” that uses big data sets and “urban analytics” to study urban planning, 
and suggests that predictive analytics can improve local policy. Why Cities?, MASS. 
INST. TECH., http://cities.media.mit.edu/about/cities (last visited Aug. 11, 2013).  New 
York University’s Center for Urban Science and Progress 
will instrument New York City and use existing data from a network of 
agencies to transform the city into a living laboratory and classroom.  It will 
make sense of the vast amount of data it collects to help cities around the 
world become more productive, more livable, more equitable, and more 
resilient. 
About CUSP, CENTER FOR URB. SCI. PROGRESS, http://cusp.nyu.edu/about/ (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2013).  In so doing, it seeks to “set the research agenda for ‘the science 
of cities.’” How and Why CUSP Came to Be, CENTER FOR URB. SCI. PROGRESS, 
http://cusp.nyu.edu/about-how/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).  IBM has developed a 
business called “Smarter Cities” to propose data-driven consulting services to cities 
around the world to improve everything from police services to education to urban 
planning. Smarter Cities, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/smarter_ 
cities/overview/index.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2013). 
 103. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology City Science project defines the 
concept in the following way: 
  In the future, cities will account for nearly 90% of global population 
growth, 80% of wealth creation, and 60% of total energy consumption.  
Developing better strategies for the creation of new cities is therefore a 
global imperative. 
  Our need to improve our understanding of cities, however, is pressed not 
only by the social relevance of urban environments, but also by the 
availability of new strategies for city-scale interventions that are enabled by 
emerging technologies.  Leveraging advances in data analysis, sensor 
technologies, and urban experiments, City Science will provide new insights 
into creating a data-driven approach to urban design and planning.  To build 
the cities that the world needs, we need a scientific understanding of cities 
that considers our built environments and the people who inhabit them.  
Our future cities will desperately need such understanding. 
Why Cities?, supra note 103; see Smarter Cities, supra note 103 (defining smart city 
projects in many areas). 
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Why haven’t we kept up?  I’m not sure.  Perhaps it’s the heavy 
theoretical orientation of the field, which, while it provides interesting 
insights, has made scholars less interested in recent developments in 
the social sciences.  Perhaps it’s happenstance.  Regardless, there is 
no barrier to local government law scholars supplementing traditional 
approaches with the use of more contemporary social science 
methodologies, as recent work discussing agglomeration economics 
and the law has shown.  To the extent we want the field to be relevant 
in the broader world of legal scholarship, we will have to, as it will be 
harder and harder to convince the multidisciplinary scholars in other 
fields to take the study of local government law seriously if it is not 
rooted in the best contemporary social science.  More importantly, we 
will have to if we want other scholars and government officials to take 
seriously the import of law and legal process to state and local policy.  
Local government scholars argue that local government law is 
crucially important to the future of cities.  But it will be hard to make 
these claims particularly convincing to other scholars or to policy-
makers if the field remains inward looking and ignores the best 
research from other fields. 
The topic of this symposium—the Fortieth anniversary of the 
Fordham Urban Law Journal—may provide us with a way out.  
Focusing on “urban law” rather than “local government law” suggests 
a focus on places—specifically dense agglomerations of people in 
urban areas—rather than on formal governmental institutions.  The 
flaws in local government law discussed above derive largely from a 
type of formalism, a focus on the formal powers of local governments 
rather than the behavior of local politicians, a focus on the way 
formal local boundaries drive individual locational choices rather 
than informal economic and social relations do.  Thinking of 
ourselves as urban law scholars as well as local governmental law 
scholars may encourage us to look at these non-governmental, non-
formal forces that drive what actually happens in our cities.  For this, 
and many other reasons, I look forward to reading the next forty 
years of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. 
